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Abstract— Worm origin identification and propagation path 
reconstruction are among the most critical problems in digital 
forensics. Until now, several methods have been proposed for 
this purpose. However, there are no suitable datasets that 
contain both normal background traffic and worm traffic that 
researchers can use them to evaluate their methods. In this 
paper, we suggest a technique to generate such datasets using 
simulation. Then, we generate several datasets for Slammer, 
Code Red I, Code Red II and modified versions of these worms 
in different scenarios using this technique and make them 
publicly available. 
Keywords— dataset generation, simulation, worm origin 
identification, worm propagation path reconstruction 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Worm origin identification and propagation path 
reconstruction are among the essential problems in digital 
forensics and helps us to understand the cause of risks and do 
better security measures. However, the evaluation of these 
methods is problematic. Both normal background traffic and 
worm traffic is required to evaluate these methods. Currently, 
in the research community to assess these methods, worm 
traffic is injected into normal background traffic that is 
generated separately, e.g. in [1] and [2] this approach is used 
to generate datasets to evaluate their proposed method. In this 
approach, the competition of worm propagation traffic with 
normal background traffic over bandwidth is not considered 
because these two traffic is not generated in the same network 
and simultaneously. Besides, obtaining normal background 
traffic is one of the main problems in evaluating worm origin 
identification methods because network administrators often 
avoid sharing their network traffic because of privacy 
concerns. Besides, because of privacy concerns, existing 
datasets are usually anonymized, e.g. MAWI[3], SANTA[4], 
LBNL[5], PUF[6], UNIBS[7], UGR 16[8], Kent[9][10] and 
so on. Currently, there are no datasets containing both normal 
background traffic and worm traffic that both traffic is 
generated simultaneously and in the same network, and those 
datasets can be used to evaluate worm origin identification 
methods. If such datasets existed, the competition of worm 
propagation traffic with normal background traffic over 
bandwidth would be considered. Also, the main challenge of 
researchers for evaluating worm origin identification methods 
that is obtaining normal background traffic would be solved. 
 The purpose of this paper is to suggest a technique to 
generate such datasets and to generate a number of such 
datasets. To do this, we examine different methods of 
generating datasets containing normal background traffic and 
worm traffic. For obtaining normal background traffic, we 
analyze 21 datasets and different traffic generators. We also 
study different technologies of creating worm experimental 
environment. The result of our investigations is that 
ReaSE[11] is a suitable tool for generating the datasets 
mentioned above. However, it needs some modifications. So 
we made required modifications in ReaSE and then we 
generate several datasets for Code Red I and Code Red II[12], 
Slammer[13] and modified versions of them in different 
scenarios. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II 
presents a discussion on possible methods of generating 
datasets for evaluating worm origin identification and 
propagation path reconstruction methods. Section III presents 
the proposed technique. This section briefly overviews ReaSE 
and its capabilities and the modifications we made to ReaSE. 
Section IV describes our generated datasets. Section V 
concludes the paper. 
II. DISCUSSION ON GENERATING DATASETS FOR WORM 
INFECTION STUDIES 
To evaluate worm origin identification and propagation 
path reconstruction methods, we need datasets containing both 
normal background traffic and worm traffic. There are two 
approaches to generate such datasets: 
1) Combining worm traffic and normal background 
traffic that is generated separately. 
2) Generating worm traffic and normal background 
traffic in the same network and simultaneously. 
 
     Also, our observations indicate that there are three ways 
to obtain normal background traffic and worm traffic: using 
existing datasets, obtaining traffic of real networks, 
generating traffic in the experimental environment. In this 
section, we investigate these three ways. 
B. Using Existing Datasets 
     In this paper, we study 21 datasets to obtain normal 
background traffic. The results are as below: 
 Some of these datasets, e.g. DARPA[14][15][16], 
KDD Cup[17], NSL-KDD[18] and PU-IDS[19] are 
outdated, and they are not suitable for today's 
evaluations because of the many modifications that 
have occurred in the traffic of networks so far. 
 Some of them, e.g. UGR 16, SSENET-2011[20], 
SSENET-2014[21], SANTA, UNIBS, Unified Host 
and Network[22], PUF, PU-IDS, NSL-KDD, Kent 
and KDD Cup, are not available in the packet-based 
format. However, to evaluate worm origin 
identification and propagation path reconstruction 
methods, we usually need network traffic in packet-
based format. 
 Some datasets, e.g. SANTA and IRSC[23], are not 
publicly available due to privacy concerns. 
 In some of them, e.g. MAWI, TUIDS[24][25], 
UNSW-NB15[26], NGIDS-DS[27] and CTU-
13[28], normal traffic and attack traffic are mixed. 
 In some datasets, e.g. LBNL, some required 
information (such as network topology, link delay, 
and bandwidth) to inject worm traffic to normal 
traffic is not available. 
 Some of them don't include some new network 
protocols. For example, ISCX[29] doesn’t include 
HTTPS. 
 The testbed of some datasets, e.g. CICIDS[30] and 
ISCX, is too small. 
 In most datasets, some packet information such as 
IP (e.g.in Unified Host and Network, PUF, UNIBS, 
MAWI, UGR 16, Kent, LBNL), payload (e.g. in 
CTU-13, MAWI, SANTA, LBNL), time (e.g. in 
Unified Host and Network, Kent) and ports (in 
Kent) are anonymized because of potential security 
risks and privacy concerns. In most datasets, the IP 
address is anonymized by preserving the prefix. 
C. Obtaining Traffic of Real Networks 
Network administrators usually refuse to share their 
network traffic due to privacy concerns, and if they do so, they 
will usually anonymize the traffic. 
D. Generating Traffic in Experimental Environment 
1) Normal Background Traffic: Most traffic generators 
generate traffic in one direction. Some others, although 
generate traffic in both directions but both sides of 
communication are not synchronous. We need two-
directional traffic that each side of communication affects the 
other side (for example, retransmitting packets in TCP, 
request-response communications in application layer 
protocols, etc.). Therefore, although the traffic generated by 
many traffic generators is suitable for performance 
evaluation, optimization, measurement of available 
bandwidth and quality of service, etc., it is not useful for 
evaluating worm origin identification and propagation path 
reconstruction methods. We discuss some traffic generators 
in the following: 
 Swing[31][32]: Swing captures the packet 
interactions of applications and extracts 
distributions for application, user, and network 
behaviour. Then, according to the underlying model, 
it generates traffic in an emulated environment. One 
of the limitations of swing is that it only generates 
realistic traces for a single link. 
 Tmix: Weigle et al.[33] proposed tmix for NS-2 
simulator[34]. Tmix extracts the source-level 
characterization of TCP connections from a packet 
header trace that is obtained from an arbitrary link 
and then emulate the socket-level behaviour of the 
source applications that created the connections in 
the trace. Adurthi et al.[35] also implemented tmix 
for GTNetS[36]. Like swing, Tmix only generates 
traffic for a single link. 
 Packmime-HTTP: Cao et al.[37] proposed a model 
for HTTP traffic generation and implemented it for 
NS-2 simulator and called it Packmime-HTTP. 
Cheng et al.[38] extended and modified Packmime-
HTTP in NS-2 to work with NS-3[39]. They also 
added an extra working mode to that. These traffic 
generators generate only HTTP traffic. 
 Ammar et al.[40] implemented a tool to generate 
traffic based on Poisson Pareto Burst Process 
(PPBP) model [41] for NS-3 simulator. This traffic 
generator generates traffic only in one direction and 
doesn’t include request-response interactions in 
application layer protocols. 
 NeSSi [42]: NeSSi is a network simulation tool that 
includes different features related to network 
security. NeSSi is built upon the JIAC[43] 
framework and has provided a distributed and 
scalable architecture. NeSSi contains a limited 
number of application layer protocols. 
2) Worm Traffic: In [44], the technologies of creating 
worm experimental environment are divided into several 
categories: analytical model, packet-level simulation, 
network emulation, hardware testbed, and hybrid method. As 
discussed in [44], The fidelity of analytical models is 
insufficient to use for our purpose. Using network emulation 
doesn't satisfy the scalability requirement of worm 
researches. Providing hardware testbed is not feasible 
because worm experiments require a large number of nodes. 
Packet-level simulation provides good scalability as well as 
better fidelity than the analytical model. Some network 
simulators that enable packet-level worm simulation are 
discussed briefly below: 
 SSFNET: Liljenstam et al.[45] extended the 
SSFNET simulator [46][47] to include behavioural 
models of internet worms. They use the detailed 
packet-level simulation for part of the network, and 
a model that is less accurate but computationally 
efficient for other parts[48]. 
 NS-2: NS-2 includes some behavioural models of 
worms. The approach used by NS-2 is similar to that 
used by SSFNet (mentioned above). Also, in NS-2, 
there is no mechanism to assign IP addresses to 
nodes, and so the scanning worm models are 
problematic[48]. 
 GTNetS: In GTNetS, we can simulate different 
worms by setting parameters such as transport layer 
protocols, infection length, scan rate, number of 
simultaneous connections, and so on. 
 PAWS [49]:  PAWS is a distributed worm spread 
simulator. It simplified worm propagation 
behaviour to enhance simulation speed. For 
example, only those scans are delivered to the 
destination that the destination host has not yet 
infected. Also, to reduce the overhead, PAWS 
aggregates the packets that want to be sent to a node 
in a single message and send the message at the end 
of the time unit. 
 Wagner et al. [50] implemented a simulator for 
worm propagation in the Perl scripting language. 
Although this simulator considers the effect of link 
bandwidth and propagation delays, but ignores 
queuing, loss and competing traffic. Also, the TCP 
model is used by TCP-based worms is simplified 
that doesn’t consider some features such as slow 
start and congestion window [48]. 
 NeSSi: In addition to normal background traffic 
generation, Nessi also makes it possible to simulate 
worm propagation. The worm propagation scheme 
provided by Nessi enables the simulation of SQL 
Slammer and Blaster worms. Additionally, the 
researchers can extend the worm model provided by 
NeSSi or develop a new one. 
III. OUR PROPOSED TECHNIQUE 
The result of our investigations is that the suitable tool for 
generating our datasets is ReaSE. However, it needs some 
modifications. In this section, we first overview ReaSE and its 
capabilities then we express the modifications we made to it. 
A. ReaSE Overview 
OMNeT++[51] is a modular, component-based C++ 
simulation library and framework, primarily for building 
network simulators. 
INET[52] framework is an extension of OMNeT++ that 
supports simulations of common internet protocols (such as 
UDP, TCP, IP, and ICMP) and intermediate and end systems 
(such as routers and hosts) and is used to simulate internet-like 
networks. 
ReaSE is a tool developed to create a realistic simulation 
environment in combination with INET framework. It 
considers three aspects: 
1) Topology generation: ReaSE uses positive-feedback 
preference model (PFP)[53] to generate realistic topologies. 
The PFP model randomly generates topologies that show 
power-law distribution in node degrees. In ReaSE, topology 
generation is divided into two parts. First, the connections of 
the ASs (Autonomous Systems) are created. Then the 
topology inside each AS is generated. The hierarchical 
structure generated for each AS consists of three layers, 
including core, gateway, and edge. 
2) Normal traffic generation: In ReaSE, realistic normal 
background traffic is generated between hosts. Realistic in 
this case means that the generated traffic exhibits self-similar 
behaviour[54] and is based on a combination of different 
types of traffic. In ReaSE, eight traffic profiles (backup, 
interactive, web, mail, nameserver, streaming, Misc, and 
ping) based on different transport layer protocols are defined. 
The behaviour of each traffic profile is determined by setting 
various parameters (such as Request Length, Reply Length, 
Requests Per Flow, Time Between Requests, Reply Per 
Request, Time To Respond, Time Between Flows, Selection 
Probability, WAN Probability). So we can generate different 
normal background traffic patterns by using different traffic 
profiles and by setting different values for the traffic profile 
parameters. 
3) Attack traffic generation: ReaSE makes it possible to 
simulate some network attacks, including worm propagation. 
Although it has been stated in [11] that both UDP-based and 
TCP-based worms have been implemented in ReaSE, TCP-
based worm is not publicly available. However, by setting 
parameters such as payload length, time between probing 
packets, infection port, the range of IP addresses to scan, we 
can simulate different UDP worms. 
B. ReaSE Modifications 
Below, we briefly explain the modifications we made to 
ReaSE and don’t discuss technical details: 
 In ReaSE, there are generally two types of nodes: 
nodes that generate normal background traffic and 
nodes that generate worm traffic. In other words, 
nodes that generate normal background traffic are 
not capable of generating worm traffic and vice 
versa. But we need to generate worm traffic and 
normal background traffic simultaneously and by the 
same nodes to take into account the competition of 
normal traffic and worm traffic over bandwidth. So 
we add the module that implements worm 
propagation functionality (e.g. udpWormVictim.ned 
in UDP-based worms) in the nodes that generate 
normal traffic and remove the nodes that only 
generate worm traffic from the simulator. 
 In real networks, a server usually plays two roles: 
- listening on a specific port and responding to 
requests 
- sending requests to other servers if needed (For 
example, a DNS server often sends requests to 
other DNS servers in the network to respond to 
client requests) 
In ReaSE, servers only play the first role. We change 
them to play both roles. 
 We use the TCPDump module of INET and provide 
the ability to capture the traffic of each node in pcap 
format. 
 In ReaSE, a source port is randomly selected for each 
traffic profile, and the specified source ports of 
traffic profiles are used for generating traffic. 
However, in real networks, hosts use a random 
source port each time they establish a connection. So 
we made modifications in ReaSE to consider this. 
 In ReaSE, the port on which each server listens to 
requests is not necessarily unique. So we change the 
servers to listen on a unique port. 
 Due to network traffic modifications, we add four 
traffic profiles, including HTTP, HTTPS, SSH, and 
FTP, to eight traffic profiles of ReaSE that can be 
used to generate normal background traffic. We also 
create a server for each of these traffic profiles 
(except SSH). 
 As previously mentioned, the TCP-based worm 
implemented in ReaSE is not publicly available. 
TCP-based worms establish a TCP connection to 
each target machine before sending payload packets. 
Besides, they use several simultaneous TCP 
connections to infect several machines 
simultaneously and speed up the propagation 
process. So by considering behaviours of TCP-based 
worms, we implement a model that different TCP-
based worms that their scanning techniques are local 
preference scanning or uniform random scanning 
and their epidemiological model are SI (Susceptible-
Infected) or SIR (Susceptible-Infected-Recovered) 
can be simulated by setting parameters such as the 
number of simultaneous connections, infection 
length, infection port, recovery probability, 
preference probability, and IP address range for 
probing packets. 
 The scanning technique of the UDP-based worm 
model implemented in ReaSE is uniform random 
scanning. We change this model such that the 
scanning technique can be either local preference 
scanning or uniform random scanning, and the 
preference probability can be set. Also, this model is 
based on SI, so we change the epidemiological 
model to be SI or SIR, and the recovery probability 
can be set. In ReaSE, the infected host always uses 
a fixed source port to send probing packets. We 
change the UDP worm model to use random source 
ports for scanning IP addresses 
C.  Generating Datasets 
     Using the technique described in this section, different 
datasets containing both normal background traffic and worm 
traffic can be generated for evaluating worm origin 
identification and propagation path reconstruction methods. 
Different traffic patterns of normal traffic can be generated 
using different traffic profiles and by setting different values 
for traffic profile parameters. Besides, different types of 
worms that their scanning strategy is preferential scanning or 
uniform random scanning can be simulated just by setting a 
number of parameters. However, other types of scanning 
worms, e.g. sequential scanning worms, can be simulated by 
making simple modifications in ReaSE. Also, different 
topologies can be generated by setting different parameters. 
D.  Validation 
     In [55], several experiments have been performed to 
validate that the topologies and background traffic generated 
by ReaSE show realistic characteristics. The results of these 
experiments are as below: 
 the topologies generated by ReaSE show the power-
law distribution in node degree well, although there 
are some deviations in a small number of nodes. 
 The generated background traffic shows self-
similarity. 
Note that we didn’t make any modifications to the 
topology generation capability of ReaSE. In addition, ReaSE 
uses two mechanisms to achieve self-similar traffic behaviour: 
1) Using several traffic sources that are switched on and 
off based on heavy-tailed intervals. 
2) Using heavy-tailed packet sizes for different traffic 
flows. 
 
     We didn’t interfere in the operation of these mechanisms. 
So the self-similarity of normal background traffic has been 
preserved. 
IV. OUR GENERATED DATASETS 
we generate two categories of datasets that each of them 
contains several sets of traffic traces. In this section, we 
explain how we generate these datasets. We will make these 
datasets publicly available as soon as possible on 
https://github.com/Sara-Asgari/Datasets. 
There are two approaches to generate realistic 
topologies[56]: 
1) generating topology based on observations of real 
networks 
2)  random topology generation 
     The topology generated using the first approach is very 
realistic. Also, Random topology generation is widely used 
in the research community[11]. We use both approaches to 
generate our datasets. 
A. Category I 
Our created topology has been derived from a simplified 
version of the topology of a large ISP in Italy and its 
bandwidths and link lengths that is stated in [57], network 
properties used in [58] and by considering current network 
topologies. Fig. 1. shows the proposed topology, and Table I 
presents bandwidths and delays of links in the proposed 
topology. This network is composed of 4 core nodes, 8 
gateway nodes, 16 edge nodes, and 200 end-hosts that are 
located in four subnets. As illustrated in Fig. 1., in this 
network, some redundancies have been considered to increase 
availability. 
To generate normal background traffic, we extract the type 
and percentage of application layer protocols of the first-day 
traffic of the CICIDS dataset (see Table II) and use these 
values to choose the traffic profiles and the selection 
probability of each one. We also extracted the approximate 
values of the parameters (on average) for each of these traffic 
profiles from this dataset. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Proposed topology in category I. 
 
TABLE I.  LINK PARAMETERS IN THE PROPOSED TOPOLOGY IN 
CATEGORY I 
Link bandwidth delay 
Core to Core 50 Gbps 3 ms 
Core to Gateway 20 Gbps 2 ms 
Gateway to Edge 10 Gbps 0.25 ms 
Edge to Server 2.5 Gbps 5 µs 
Edge to Client 100 Mbps 5 µs 
 
TABLE II.  TRAFFIC PROFILES WITH PERCENTAGES IN CATEGORY I 
Traffic Profile % 
HTTP 53.85% 
HTTPS 38.13% 
DNS 6.87% 
SSH 0.78% 
FTP 0.20% 
Email 0.14% 
Ping 0.03% 
 
     In category I, we generate six sets of traffic traces. The 
infection network and worm propagation parameters in these 
sets are presented in Table III. In each set, the specified worm 
propagates three times with different origins and propagation 
paths in the network. The simulated worms are Code Red I, 
Code Red II, quasi Code Red II, Slammer and quasi Slammer. 
The scanning technique of quasi Slammer is local preference 
while Slammer worm use uniform random scanning 
technique. Also, the preference probability parameter of quasi 
Code Red II is different from the original version of Code Red 
II. In our simulations, we focus on spreading part of worms 
and ignore their attacking part.  
     In simulated TCP worms, the number of concurrent 
connections is much lower than the value of this parameter in 
the original Code Red I and Code Red II because the original 
versions of Code Red have been propagated in Internet 
containing several thousands of machines, but the number of 
nodes in our simulations is much lower. So setting large values 
for this parameter causes the network to become infected in a 
fraction of a second that is usually not suitable for evaluations. 
Also, in our simulated UDP worms, the time between probing 
packets is much greater than the value of this parameter in the 
original version of Slammer worm. 
 
TABLE III.  OUR GENERATED DATASETS 
Infection network 
parameters 
Worm parameters dataset 
C
a
te
g
o
ry
 I
 
Type of 
nodes 
Number 
of nodes 
Recovery 
Probability 
Preference 
probability 
(local preference 
scanning worms) 
Scanning 
strategy 
 
Time between 
probing 
packets (UDP 
worms) 
Number of 
concurrent 
connection 
(TCP 
worms) 
Transport 
layer 
protocol 
name 
HTTP 
Server, 
HTTPS 
Server and 
Client 
30 10-4 per ms - Uniform 
Random 
Uniform(4ms,
8ms) 
- UDP Slammer Set 1 
HTTP 
Server 
28 10-4 per ms 
 
1
8
: random 
4
8
: same class A 
3
8
: same class B 
 
Local 
Preference 
Uniform(5ms,
10ms) 
- UDP Quasi 
Slammer 
Set 2 
Client 35 10-4 per ms 0.3: random 
0.7: same subnet 
Local 
Preference 
Uniform(5ms,
10ms) 
- UDP Quasi 
Slammer 
Set 3 
HTTP 
Server 
28 10-4 per ms - Uniform 
Random 
- 23 TCP Code 
Red I 
Set 4 
HTTP 
Server 
28 10-4 per ms 1
8
: random 
4
8
: same class A 
3
8
: same class B 
 
Local 
Preference 
- 25 TCP Code 
Red II 
Set 5 
Client 35 10-4 per ms 0.3: random 
0.7: same subnet 
Local 
Preference 
- 25 TCP Quasi 
Code 
Red II 
Set 6 
HTTP 
Server 
52 10-5 per ms 0.3: random 
0.7: same subnet 
Local 
Preference 
- 20 TCP Quasi 
Code 
Red II 
Set 1 
C
a
te
g
o
ry
 I
I
 
HTTP 
Server 
52 10-5 per ms 0.3: random 
0.7: same subnet 
Local 
Preference 
Uniform(10ms
,12ms) 
- UDP Quasi 
Slammer 
Set 2 
B. Category II 
     In category II, we use topology generation capability 
provided by ReaSE for creating the network topology. This 
topology is shown in Fig. 2., also Link parameters in this 
topology are presented in Table IV. This network is 
composed of 10 core nodes, 20 gateway nodes, 152 edge 
nodes, and 1090 end-hosts and consists of 10 subnets. 
     The type and percentage of application layer protocols 
used in normal traffic generation are shown in Table V. 
Also, the values set for traffic profile parameters are 
different from category I. 
     In category II, we generate two sets of traffic traces. The 
simulated worms are the same as category I that some 
parameters of them are changed (see Table III). 
 
Fig. 2. Proposed topology in category II. 
Fig. 3. Link Parameters in The Proposed Topology in Category II 
Link  bandwidth delay 
Core to Core  40 Gbps 4 ms 
Core to Gateway 16 Gbps 2.5 ms 
Gateway to Edge 8 Gbps 0.3 ms 
Edge to Server 2 Gbps 10 µs 
Edge to Client 80 Mbps 10 µs 
 
Fig. 4. Traffic Profiles with Percentages in Category II 
Traffic Profile  % 
HTTPS 49.2% 
HTTP 35.5% 
DNS 8.9% 
FTP 3.3% 
Email 2.8% 
V. CONCLUSION 
     In this paper, we suggested a technique for generating 
datasets containing both normal background traffic and 
worm traffic that can be used to evaluate worm origin 
identification and propagation path reconstruction 
methods. To do this, we investigated different methods of 
generating such datasets. The result of our investigations 
was that ReaSE is a suitable tool for this purpose but needs 
some modifications. Using this technique, different 
datasets (different types of worms, topologies and normal 
background traffic) can be generated. In addition, we 
discussed the validation of the generated topologies and 
normal traffic and explained that they show realistic 
characteristics. We also generated multiple datasets for 
both UDP-based and TCP-based worms with different 
parameters in two different networks with different 
background traffic. 
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